

Let us talk about intelligence.

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In a previous work we discussed the principles for which one can identify “affective intelligence”, well differentiated from the two other expressions, the “emotive” and the “cognitive rational”, that complement each other and function in unison, in a concomitant form.

This differentiation is based on the difficulty to draw near the classification mostly used that divides intelligence in “rational” and “emotive” (Coleman, 1998), underlining that perhaps this modality is also due to the difficulty of the English language to differentiate something that stays in one idiomatic expression: “emotional life”.

The two classifications, seen in this way, do not clash, but only need a careful observation to justify the differences and therefore recover all the important work done by many researchers.

In this analysis we have examined a vast amount of material which is important to take into consideration; in order not to lose the validity of the researches, we thought to deal with them and report them in a colloquial way, as a series of questions that can be answered taking into account the validity of our observation on “affective intelligence”.

In the exposition, the statements of the different researchers will not be referred to with a precise bibliographic reference, just because the end is not to create a clash, but to propose a serene integration of the ideas.

1. “How many emotions are there? At least five: anger, fear, sadness, disgust and joy, but beyond those that we call basic, we also find: feeling of guilt, desperation, rage, envy, jealousy, surprise, excitement, tenderness, love, ... Those, however, are sentiments that, although similar to emotions, get considered in a different way:
 - the emotions are biological, that is drive;
 - the sentiments are secondary elaborations, since they go through the mind.

Emotion and sentiment are two terms that often get confused.” (Isabelle Filliozat, 1998)

It seems to us that this passage could be considered a paradigm and also fundamental to *definitely distinguish emotions from affection*.

Everything would seem so simple, but ... the confusion continues!!

2. Talking about “emotive intelligence” we include an “... *intelligence of the social interactions* ” that in fact is a clear reference to *affective intelligence* (A.I.), even if this is something more, since it includes not only the “relationship with the other”, but also the “relationship with oneself”. A.I. has its foundations in the values and foremost in the recognition with oneself as value, as autonomous function that is at the base of the most primitive structuring of that “proto-ego” that through experience will become a real “structured and integrated ego”.

3. Criticising the I.Q. that is identified as a result of applying intelligence tests that are nothing but the "... arbitrary scholastic exercises ...", we evidence that numerous intelligences exist. We find a list of seven:

1. verbal intelligence
2. logical-mathematic intelligence (*considered in intellectual tests*)
3. spatial intelligence - *ability to represent in 3 dimensions and to find one's way; developed in seamen, engineers, surgeons, sculptors, painters, architects etc.)*
4. musical intelligence - *that recognises phrasing and rhythm*
5. body intelligence - *used by athletes, dancers, and artisans*
6. interpersonal intelligence - *ability to understand others*
7. intrapersonal intelligence - *being able to trace a precise representation of oneself and to use it effectively in daily life.*

Evidently 6 and 7 refer to A.I., although, in the others (for ex. the body) there are many affective elements, recognised as "love for one's own body", "desire towards the other", need to have a confrontation, search for a professional "perfection" etc.

4. One reads: "... *the old system* (the one that was only recognising intelligence as cognitive) *had a paradigm, the idea of reason free of emotional pressures, whereas the new one* (which recognises the value of "emotional life") *invites us to harmonise reason and sentiment*".

In this phrase is a huge mistake just because we cannot talk of emotional life (that is instinctive, immediate and based on the stimulus-response scheme) with the sentiments that, to the contrary, ask for a deep psychic elaboration, founded on relationships.

5. We talk of "emotive intelligence", but, in our way of seeing, the competencies that are ascribed to it are just those of affectivity:

- ability to motivate oneself (volition)
- " " persevere (capacity on objectives)
- " " persevere even facing adversities
- " " control primitive impulses
- " " contain frustrations and disappointments
- " not to loose one's temper
- " " develop hope
- " " act with empathy (as well as with liking).

6. In the sphere of "emotive intelligence", someone also spoke of *heart intelligence*, but we need to be careful that aspects too accentuated of happiness and satisfaction are closely bound to libidinal and instinctive processes that have little to do with the affective "complexity". What should always be kept in mind is that the affective answer presumes the participation of the most evolved structures, cortical, responsible to complex functions, far away to instinctive life that has its psychological opposition in libido.

7. Often one reads that emotive intelligence "joins us with our most true aspects, with the deepest motivations", nearly to demonstrate an ethical and moral

supremacy in front of “coldness of reasoning”. We do not believe this categorisation since:

- a) the three functions of intelligence (emotive-affective-cognitive) are so interconnected that they can not possibly be separate, if not in situations of pathology;
- b) one has to remember that a mentally insufficient, although rich of affectivity, always stays disabled.

8. When one reads that to intelligence of reason the one of the heart should be added, because otherwise the emotions will destroy the world, we have to take into account, although it is valid to separate emotions from affects, these are insufficient functions to explain the human behaviour both individual and in the group, just because the pathological elements (personality disorders, etc.) are unrestrained factors. It seems to us that we have to underline this aspect especially when one talks of “seven” and/or also the ethical-political processes that have strongly hit the world, as it has been for Nazism and under many aspects also for communism.

9. In emotive intelligence we recognise “... *to understand the others, to react with empathy to their needs and their sentiments...: this brings us to be less afraid because the other is not seen any more as persecutor and the individual shows solidarity and is more inclined to cooperation*”.

In the misunderstanding that once again one observes in setting emotions against reasoning without considering the affective world one hides the impossibility to comprehend that it is just the passing from subjective to social and to determine the structuring of a relationship balanced between emotive, affective and cognitive.

Self-recognition and self-valorisation allow identifying the value of the other that interferes and collaborates with us in a dimension that intensifies the cognitive value of being able to recognise the reality, the history, the past, the becoming in respect of oneself and the other.

10. An other definition tells us that:

- a) *“the emotion can be stirred up by something that happens outside us or by a memory-thought;*
- b) *and ... informs us on the surrounding world much faster than the hypothetic-deductive reasoning;*
- c) *... this way the emotions give us conscience to exist, to live and to be individuals with our own personality”.*

Trying to understand better we can say that:

- a) the emotion is consequent to an internal stimulus (thought-memory) or something that comes from the outside world;
- b) the internal or external input starts a response that is much more rapid than the cognitive one;
- c) one cannot make out how the emotions (how they are specified above), which are an immediate answer to an input, could also allow to structure “consciousness”. Evidently being conscious to exist, to live and to be individuals capable of thinking autonomously derives from a much more complex mental process, that surely develops at the level of affective

functions (I am I; I count and I esteem myself) and cognitive (conscious to be and above all able to think my thought).

11. A good description of an emotive response says: “... *the parameters of the emotions regard:*

a) *a somatic factor (effort, pain, external stimulus)*

b) *an emotive factor (panic, emptiness, etc.)*

c) *a plan of action that is an answer (to attack, to escape, to hide, to explore).*

What a shame that this definition of the concept of emotion follows immediately “... *but the necessity for a cognitive process is proven*”, a phrase that becomes little evident since it refers to an other mental process (cognitive) that can also be consequent, but is certainly separate and different from emotive function.

12. The emotions go along to a visceral response (increase in blood pressure, perspiration, increase in the electric activity of the skin, hyperpnea, increase in skin temperature, micromovements of the muscles, acceleration of pulse) and to a physical response (to escape, to shout, to run, to hit ... are suitable motors at their service). The metabolism provides the necessary energy and justifies the activation of the *likeable system* that can induce a new request to be inhibited. These observations establish strict parameters to define the emotions and it seems incredible that important researchers are not able to respect them for which one generates and/or continues the confusion with the affective answers.

13. In a really brilliant experiment it could be ascertained that in the people that say “not to prove anything” the peripheral reactions get recorded normally, but one observes also a hyperactivity of the frontal lobe that justifies the respective emotive anaesthesia.

14. In other experiments this was verified:

a) the left-hand prefrontal lobe inhibits sensations of fear, joy, hope, gratitude;

b) the right-hand temporal lobe acts on the unpleasant emotions such as anger and sadness.

In our way of seeing these experimental observations they prove that the affective activity, that has an anatomical-functional substratum in the prefrontal lobes, acts as regulating mechanism, other than of control, on the emotions.

15. We also found that “... *the emotion differs from the sentiment since it results to be an immediate affective reaction to an external stimulus that provokes an immediate reaction.*”

It seems to be a sheer together of words that nearly seem synonyms, that assume meanings, variable and at pleasure.

16. We read that “... *while the emotive impulses have origin in the limbical centres, the way to express the emotions is regulated from recent structures situated in the deep cortex*”.

This consideration sees the affects as “regulation” of the emotions taking from them, a dimension of “priority value” that we instead assert since it is extremely reductive to think in an evolution that helps only as control (a simple circuit of retrograde functioning would have been enough) that mainly inhibits and can, to a lesser degree, accentuate. The affects are really something different and, above all, fundamental for the development and for the functioning of the mind. The world of self-esteem, values, recognition of the other same or different from us are the real foundations of what we call *affective intelligence*.

17. Cliff Sacon and Richard J. Davidson (1998) describe two elements of the emotive response:
 - a) – in the first they recognise “... *conscious physical sensations (for ex. the nervous tension) that involves the intervention of inferior structures of the brain that control the autonomous nervous system, determining the release of hormones and have effects of short duration;*
 - b) *in the second they count the psychological answers that have a longer latency and last longer.*”

18. “... *a preconscious activation of the brain generates emotions, whereas the sentiments derive from a conscious elaboration*”.
Certainly this definition traces a wall between emotivity and affectivity, even if it results slightly restrictive since it does not explain how the affective response too could, in a second moment, generate an increase or a decrease of the “emotive tone” and of the reactive ability of emotive-instinctual type.

19. To demonstrate how much the definitions used to explain what is intended as intelligence might be unclear, we report:
“*social intelligence is that possibility to modulate the expectations to carry out an interactive task that has to take into account of the real possibilities to realise what is desired.*”
In this sentence the “interaction” is seen only from the viewpoint of the subject and therefore the social intelligence becomes a sort of “tension” between “desire” (expectations) and “realisational possibilities”. The analysed dimension in this way is too poor and starts from the clear sensation that the ego of the subject is extremely weak.
However it might be, this definition of social intelligence is too limitative to be taken up as definition.

Affective responses

If those that we have until now analysed are *emotive responses* (adaptive, libidinal, spontaneous, unconscious, more physical than mental, characterised by short latency and duration) what are the *affective responses*?

Many authors talk of *sentiments* and just these are the answers of the affective sphere, the affects, the reactions that enter the *world of values*.

The most simplistic meaning of affects is the one that ascribes them to attachment, to tenderness, to dedication, to gratitude and to love, that stand out as requests of closeness, of comfort, of sympathy and also of erotism, all sentiments that one reassumes in the love of someone.

This however is a reductive interpretation of the *values* that recall reciprocity beyond the valorisation of oneself as point of departure for the valorisation of the other.

When we read that “... *the sentiment can not be considered as resulting, in everlasting evolution, of different moods that interact with each other, filtered by critical and intellective control, that works out the sentiments*”, we stay disconcerted by confusion!

That the intellective process elaborates the *sentiments* (the affects) is at least a bold statement, but that again the sentiment results from the everlasting evolution of different *moods* (which are not for nothing defined) is something incomprehensible.

If the emotions are immediate, the sentiments result mediated, respond therefore to a “project”, to a scheme, so to say, preformed.

When we affirm that the emotions are instinctive, libidical, automatic and we consider them, therefore, “primitive” because they are linked to the limbic brain (to the brain of snakes) we try to mean something very close to the “cause-effect answer” even though, how we have underlined in a previous work (Lucioni, 1999), determined also by a certain degree of learning.

There certainly is a specific memory that subtends the physical-instinctive answers how the emotions are, but, just for the defensive finality, demonstrative and of short duration, it does not allow a fine, complex, procedural.

The *affective response* is much more thoughtful, procedural, meditated, mediated, filtered and answers much more to something that one went structuring with experience. It is linked to a finely adaptive process that we call *feedback*, from one side and that we refer to much more subjective proceedings that we recognise in *will*.

Volition and *mediation* could be indicated as the poles of influence between which one structures and determines the *affective response*.

The volition is subtended by self-esteem, by the sense of value and power and makes itself explicit in the *sense of being* and *wanting to be*. In some way, it opposes itself to the other with which however the oneself establishes relationship of collaboration and solidarity, structuring this way those values of characteristic mediation in the social relationship.

When we speak of affectivity, that, being a psychic function, measures itself as process, we mean a sort of tortuous and difficult “path” that, coming from self-consciousness brings the subject to develop an own identity, but also a uniqueness and an ingeniousness that interlace in the structure of ego and personality. This journey, tormented and, sometimes, tragic, but also always “bright”, brings to the meeting with the other with which the subject establishes subjective, biunivocal and social relationships.

Considering affectivity, we recognise in it a relational and social aspect; first of all we must make clear that in the relationship we include the primary recognition to the relationship with oneself.

The *self-identification* is perhaps the primary psychic function and also the most important one if as “identification” or “self-identification” it acts as foundation for the structuring of a “proto-ego” before the ego (Lucioni, 1999) and, from this point of view, it becomes indispensable for the evolution of all the psychic functions.

To recognise oneself the newborn must be able to “live” as “one’s own” the sensations derived from external stimuli (tactile sensitivity, etc.) and interior (proprioceptive and enteroceptive sensibility), one’s own body, the space that it occupies, the dynamism of the movements.

The perception of this *individual self-ascribed reality* brings to develop a sense of being and existing, but also *of being able to live over time*. The rhythmicity of sleep and waking, other than the periodicity of taking in the food (that conforms so and/or regulates the sense of hunger), presume an “expectation”: a “waiting for foreseen event”. Everything how often it might be repeated or might be consequent (looking in the eyes and receive a smile etc.) is the expression of a timing that develops in the sequence now-after (the time that has passed will be elaborated on a symbolical plane, with cognitive development).

Self-recognition consists therefore of varied stages:

- a) essence: I am, I exist, I occupy another space;
- b) vitality: I can move, can change in the space, can perceive, can react;
- c) finality: I want, I make an effort in order to, can reach my goal, create my expectations;

that structure the volitive self-consciousness evidenced as:

autodefensive capacity
aggressive capacity } that allow to:
*project oneself into time, into becoming =
create oneself a future*

creating programs directed to prevent, neutralise and/or hypercompensate situations not yet in action, but foreseeable with greater clarity, precision and reliability.

In this way “the subject” is created as *autonomous entity*, self-confident, proud of oneself, projected into becoming and in the end, other than capable to get into the conceived collectivity as together of other characters already recognised, polymorphous and dynamically related.

When we face the world of affects (or of values), we find ourselves having to take into account the structure of the Ego because the axiology is represented by two components; the internal qualities relative to Ego and the external that has its foundations in ways, in traditions, in customs, in habits of society in which the subject is moving.

What regards the Ego, we find that this, being a psychic function, is being shaped:

- a) on *structural elements* modifyable with the influence of experience (stimuli and memories);
- b) on values activated and “compacted” by the experiences and by the experienced.

In the Ego, therefore, we can highlight several elements:

- 1) *structural*: intelligence (analitical-deductive), memory;
- 2) *adaptive*: attention, will, perseverance, stubbornness, moderation, serenity, tranquillity, objectivity;

- 3) *defensive*: tolerance, altruism, goodness, conviviality, acceptance, attachment, understanding.


Given that the ego is a trial and procedural function, we must think that it will go structuring over time, we can therefore say that the defensive elements and those valorising will have a cognitive-rational preeminence, a symbolical-transcendent one or a greater emotive-affective force will prevail according to the experiences, the situations and also the emotive pressures (for ex. under a strongly emotive stimulus, as the vision of suffering, an affective predisposition of solidarity is more marked).

The categorisation of the elements structuring the functional possibilities of the ego helps us to understand how this is really in a continuous and dynamic transformation even if the *structural elements* are essential to determine a certain functional “level” (who has more reasoning-deductive intelligence or who has more memory obviously will be able to count on a “global ability” raised higher, richer, more modulating).

The *defensive elements* allow to structure a more valid sense of oneself and a sense of *power*, other than determining that “personal satisfaction” that Lopez (1998) has indicated as “blissful aspect” or “ecstatic narcissism” (primitive ecstasy) that characterises, so to say, the instinctive libidical self-recognition of the first months of life.

The affective intelligence can also be called relational, social or better, thoughtful, just to indicate that intimate reaction, deep and personal, that characterises adjustment of oneself to internal pushes (needs) and to the social necessities or to those of the other.

In this dynamic the relation between subject and object is biunivocal,



characterised by getting aware of the value of feed-back and the use of a simple and effective communication, without semantic halos, in full respect of the needs of the two “actors”.

Speaking of affectivity, we find ourselves in front of problems that regard psychological architecture of man for which (Tovvy and Cosmides, 1992) every hypothesis must satisfy *risolutive* (being capable of resolving the questions) and *evolutional criteria* (being able to adapt to the modifications induced by changes necessary to face a “world” in continuous evolution).

To adapt to the ontogenetic necessities of the mental mechanisms, our psycho-neuro-biological system had to be structured in a way so to reach the ability to “*read the mind*”, that is to evolve to be able to “*think the thought*” not only the subjective one, but also the one of the other wrapped in the dyad relationship.

Simon Baron-Cohen (1995) has produced an original interpretation on the functioning of the mind and on its architecture, dealing with the four main properties: volition, perception, sharing of attention and epistemic states, which although they are not the only ones, are undoubtedly the more important ones. If we take ourselves back to a child that grows in the need to understand the other to adapt to it or in any case to reach a self-consciousness and a self-esteem. In this process of approach and of inquiry, the simple generical perceptive act must be overcome to reach the deciphering of the meaning of gestures, the aspirations and the will of the other and so that one can compare the pushes that create in the dyad relation.

To better understand the problems linked to affectivity, we must therefore analyse what happens in the subject (taking into account the needs of oneself) during the interpersonal and social relationship.

A) – As we have seen, the relationship is subordinated to the sense of value that oneself gives to oneself and that first of all, depends of the self-identification.

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| <i>Self-identification</i> | - sense of being |
| that structures | - sense of existing |
| <i>self-conscience</i> | - sense of counting as an individual |
| and <i>self-esteem</i> | - sense of irreplaceability |
| | - sense of permanency over time |
| | - sense of power |
| | - sense of having one's role |
| | - sense of being normal |
| | - sense of being accepted for what one is |
| | - sense of being accepted since adapted |
| | - sense of being understood other than understanding |

This model of self-identification based on self-consciousness and self-worth has all the characters of an *evolutive process, that answers that is to a structure and to experiences*; in other words, self-identification participates to the structure of personality. The experiences model the structure (hardware) and the mental mechanisms (software) that represent the capacity and/or the modalities of answering in objectual relationships the regard:


- first of all oneself
- the figures of reference
- the others
- the world

Evidently these *reactive capacities* depend of

- a) the needs = instinctive side of the ego (ideal of the ego)
- b) the desires = thoughtful elaboration of the ego in relation to the experiences
- c) the models = cognitive-rational aspect of ego (ideal ego) structured on the super-ego relations

If we take point b), that we are analysing in relation to affectivity, we can say, that depending on experience and the background, the affective reactive abilities

answer to conscious and subconscious pushes that reflect reactive constructions linked to the dyad *like-dislike*, attraction and repulsion, attachment and aversion. The oneself-other relationship structures therefore on three poles:



This model of mental functioning if on one hand allows us to process a sort of evolutive mechanism that in final analysis has its equilibrating system in the cognitive-rational functionality, on the other side it allows us to observe also other possibilities that result decisive to structure the behaviour.

- 1) Given the case of an obsession on the libidinal-instinctive elements (see for instance the behaviour of drug-addiction) for which the deep needs, subconscious, primitive and narcissist dominated by needs, the mental mechanisms are pre-cognitive, centred on almightiness, egocentrism and determine a flight from reality.
- 2) When the affective concomitants prevail to oneself, with an obsessive need to preserve a weak self-esteem or one that is mined by cannibalistic and destructive Super-egoic feelings, the behaviour will result dominated by the resolution of needs, conscious and most of all subconscious, that make the social and/or interpersonal relationship difficult. The mental processes are dominated by a constant and obsessive need to reinforce self-esteem, continuously risked by the difficulties to make another realise to the other one's own rights. The truth get's exhausted in the personal and subjective needs, accompanied by modalities of devaluing the other experience as

- persecutory → generates attitudes sadical-anal
 - (abandonic) → generates a spiteful oral or food discontent.

- 3) The rationalising modalities can prevail too and, in this case, structures mechanisms of scrupulosity, (tiziostic) and of over-measurement of the ideal image of ego that bring to behaviours that although formally correct, result non-affective. In other words the other has value only since experienced as part of the subject, because it follows the impositions, the rigid operative-

behavioural modalities of a “hyper-lawfulness” or “hyper-moralism” that however they never manage to save the subjectivity of the other to be free and independent.

This circular vision of the functioning of the mind is founded also on what was already remembered on the relationships between emotive, affective and rational intelligence: only an integration can allow adequate choices and behaviours.


EMOTIONALISM

Stimulus ⇨ adaptation

AFFECTIVITY



Stimulus ⇨ instinctive -affective processing ⇨ adaptive response

Stimulus ⇨ instinctive processing ⇨ discriminate and volitive choice answer



RATIONALITY

Stimulus ⇨ instinctive -affective processing ⇨ discriminated and volitive choice



integrated response

These observations take us to consider that:

- a) Only a good perception of oneself, that is an adequate self-esteem can lead to the structuring of sound interpersonal relationships and therefore a sound ability to manage the interpersonal relationship.
- b) Having a good cognitive ability is not necessarily the passport for a happy life, in contrary, generally too rigid a closure on the rational predominance leads to a deep sense of mistrust, gelsy, incapacity to establish relationships with

dialogue (the relation structures on idealistic convictions) and, in the final analysis dissatisfaction and insecurity grows (the other can only be “bought”).

c) Overcoming regressive positions (primary narcissism, egocentrism and omnipotence) is essential to take up the path of the integration of the ego and the personality.

Let's find a support to these conclusions in what Christina Riva Crugnola (1993) writes: “... *the affects appear to cover the organisational functions of the psychic life and its development ...; in this perspective the reality of the object still appears anchored, since the most precocious times, to cognitive and affective processes ... tightly intertwined between each other*”.

Confirming the importance of emotive and affective valencies, in the sphere of psychic development and of their weave with those cognitive, to reach a complete and integrated development of the personality, results to be the foundation to explain the clinical observations and direct them to a successful psychotherapy.

Continuing in this analysis one can remember the “mental states” of Emde and Buchsbaun (1989) that “... supply the substance to the first links with reality, being set up of at the same time as *original affective memories* of the first relationships Oneself-other”: “... the affects would be operating as *first motivational system*, being intimately connected with the fixed idea through memory of an internalised knot of relationships with the objects” (1992).

As C. Riva Crugnola notes it is interesting to indicate how the affects assume an important meaning placing themselves as bridge between psychoanalytical hypothesis and empirical data, allowing a sort of freezing, inside the psychoanalytical discipline, between “driving model” and “objective relationships model”. According to Kernberg (1992) the affects work as *organisers of the libidical and aggressive drives and also as memories of interiorised relationships*.

It is important to point out that when we speak of affects, the libidical-aggressive functions should not be seen as negative expressions since inside them all the valencies that, how we already saw, refer to the sense of power and to the wish to be oneself, that is all those experiences that mirror the wish to propose oneself, to act one's own possibilities, to differentiate the world and the others; in the final analysis, what we call “volition”, desire to express one's own potentialities.

To clarify this concept we can take up our observations once again with autistic children (Lucioni, 1997) that demonstrate (before the therapy) a real terror to take up a responsibility (they avoid to act, to implement actions that they live as destructive in comparison with the others, so they avoid to throw something or to kick a ball) and it is always the task of the “emotive-affective integration therapy” (E.I.T.) to bring them to free themselves of the anguish and to act out one's initiatives with confidence.

A particular interest has the study of how it is structuring, from a neurofunctional point of view, those that we can call stereotypical modalities of mental functioning.

To try to shed some light on this theme it suffices to remember what happens in the couple that separates. In these cases, the “affective link” stays unchanged for long periods of time even when persecutory factors and/or those reasonably important to justify the break-up are present.

It almost seems that an “obsessive” bond has formed, unchangeable, unassailable even when “reasonable” justifications for a refusal are present.

In a previous work (Lucioni, 1999) observations were reported that were demanded to justify the permanence of the “mnemonic traces”: it would concern

neuro-functional circuits that, once stabilised, result nearly unmodifiable and reemerge constantly.

The problem of E. Q. has invested the way of “scientific thinking” because the relationship of power and those that determine the roles inside society are changed. With these observations we take the problem of intelligence to a pragmatic level that maybe makes us, once again, loose sight of the unity of the mental functioning to run after the chimeras of supremacy.

Once we said:

“... it is essential to identify to the image of a group, self-control, the conformity, obedience, the acceptance of the principles recognised as more useful and more effective,”... identification in a project, in a goal and in a group is the presupposition for success”.

Today we say:

“... one requires autonomy, initiative, personal realisation, competence, authenticity. Critical Spirit ... Putting oneself in relation of capacity with everybody in order to draw the best out of everyone”.

It would seem that what “we said” represents, in a way, the supremacy of I.Q. while the “we say” means the burst into the emotive world to constitute an *emotive and rational intelligence* but maybe all this is charged with a big misunderstanding: the conflict.

If the I.Q. is represented by finding security in the belonging to a group, to family or to a business, it would seem that all this would be replaced by a Q.E. that is equivalent to finding security in oneself.

The little clarity with which the limits were established between emotive and affective brought misunderstandings: the real problem is in not having managed to find the role of values, that is that world, that area and that function closely linked to *affective intelligence*.

We read: “... the only answer to the challenges of complexity of modern society is in the access to our true emotions” we think it is necessary to look at ourselves from the chimera of a “new truth” opposed to the old one: E.Q. against I.Q.